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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ST!\TE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 19335

-v-

STANLEY VAN OLDROYD,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal case.

By information filed in

the Tenth Circuit Court of Sevier County, the appellant,
Stanley van Oldroyd, was charged with two crimes; aggravated
assault, contrary to u.C.A. 1953,

~

76-5-103, and assault on a

police officer, contrary to U.C .A. 1953,

~

76-5-102.4 (R.l).

Proceedings of the Circuit Court resulted in a dismissal of
the offense of assault on a police officer, and appellant was
arraigned in the District Court on the single charge of
aggravated assault (R. 15).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury which found him
guilty of aggravated assault on May 3, 1983, in the Sixth
Judicial District Court of sevier county, the Honorable Don V.
Tibbs presiding (R. 70).

The District Court sentenced

appellant to a three-year term of probation, which called for
a fine of $2,500.00 and incarceration in the County Jail for
sixty days. Appellant appeals from the verdict and judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the appellant's conviction and sentence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the time of the crime, appellant and his wife
were experiencing marital difficulties and were living
separate and apart.

Mrs. Oldroyd was residing in a basement

apartment (apartment No. 5) in Richfield, Utah (T. 69).
on February 24, 1983, at approximately 8:20 p.m.,
appellant appeared at the door of Mrs. Oldroyd's apartment.
She refused him admittance to the apartment and requested that
he leave (T. 70).

Mrs. Oldroyd testified that she was afraid

of him and telephoned the police for assistance (T. 71).
Appellant remained near the doorway for about thirty
minutes (T. 70).

He and Mrs. Oldroyd could see one another

through a closed glass door, but Mrs. Oldroyd did not see a
gun in appellant's possession (T. 74).
Officer John Evans of the Richfield Police
Department responded to Mrs. Oldroyd's telephone call (T. 7nl.
Officers Rex Dana and Virgil Sickels of the Richfield police
Department also arrived at the apartment building at
approximately the same time as did Officer Evans (T. 86).
- 2 -

officer Evans testified that he did not know where apartment
Nn. 5 was located IT. 76), but as he approached the stairwell
0f the apartment,

followed by officers Dana and Sickels IT.

771, he heard the sound of a revolver being cocked.

on

hearing the sound, he turned on his flashlight and saw
appellant seated on the fourth or fifth step of the stairway
leading down to the apartment, with a revolver pointed
directly at him IT. 77, 78, 82).

Officer Evans jumped back

and went to his patrol car for a radio and a shotgun (T. 78).
Officer Evans returned to the scene and asked
appellant several times to throw his gun out.
eight minutes, appellant did so.

After five to

Officer Evans picked the

revolver up from the ground and found it to be in an uncocked
position and with no bullets in it IT. 82, 83).

When Officer

Evans first saw appellant on the stairway, he could not see
whether the hammer of the revolver was in a cocked position
IT. 82, 83).

When Officers Dana and Sickels arrived at the
apartment building, Officer Dana walked over to appellant's
truck which was parked on the shoulder of the road.

Finding

no one in the truck, he walked over to the other two officers
near the stairway to apartment No. 5 IT. 86, 87).

Officer

Dana testified that as he approached the two officers he heard
what sounded like the turning of a cylinder on a revolver
IT. 88,90).

Officer Sickels testified that when officer Evans
went to his patrol car for a radio and shotgun, he was at the
-
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top of the stairway looking down into the stairwell where fr"ci
the light of Officer Dana's flashlight he saw appellant
standing with his revolver pointed up the stairway (T. 93,
97).

while Officer Evans was asking appellant to throw his

gun out, Officer Evans heard a cylinder turn and the clicking
of a revolver (T. 94).
After appellant was arrested, six bullets were found
in his left front pocket (T. 89) and a holster for the
revolver in his right rear pocket (T. 81).
Appellant testified in his own defense.

He

testified that he stood at the doorway to his wife's apartment
talking to her for some time before the police officers
arrived (T. 105).

He han the revolver with him which he

intenrled to leave with his wife (T. 111).

Although he had

bullets in his pocket, he never took them out (T. 106, 107).
When the revolver is opened, the cylinder falls out.

The

cylinder was open all the time and was never closed (T. 109,
112).

When asked if the cylinder rotated making a clicking

sound heard by Officers Dana and Sickels, appellant replied
that it did (T. 109, llO).
Appellant testified that because of the flashlight
shining in his eyes, did not recognize Officer Evans, nor did
he observe a police uniform (T. 107).

He said he did not

point his revolver at anyone (T. 108) or ever aim it up the
stairway (T. 114), but that when officer Evans shined his
flashlight down the stairwell, he was leaning against the east
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wall away from the steps with his right arm hanging down along
his side and the revolver hanging on his finger with the
cylinder open (T. 114).
Appellant submitted to the District Court his
requested Jury Instruction No. 2, which charged that the jury
should consider two lesser included instructions to the
offense of aggravated assault, one being "threatening with a
~angerous

weapon" as proscribed by U.C.A. 1953, S 76-10-506,

and the other being ordinary "assault" as proscribed by U.C.A.
1953, S 76-5-102 (R. 51,52).

The Court refused to give the

requested Instruction and appellant took exception thereto
(T. 122, 123).

In his brief to this Court, under Relief

sought on Appeal, appellant claims the District Court
committed error in failing to charge the jury with an
instruction regarding a lesser included offense.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPF.RLY REFUSED TO GIVE
APPELLANT'S PROFFERED JURY INSTRUCTION
REGARDING THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF
"THREATENING WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON."
Appellant contends that the District Court erred
when it refused to give a preferred jury instruction regarding
the lesser included offense of "threatening with a dangerous
weapon" as proscribed by u.cs.A. 1953, S 76-10-506.

In his

aigument, appellant states that as authority for his position,
he relies primarily on the rules and principles announced by
this Court in the recent case of State v. Raker, Case NO.

-
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18245, filed on ~eptember 21, 19R3.

Respondent also relies on

that case as authority for its position.
In Baker, this Court clarified the standards to be
used in giving a jury instruction with respect to a lesser
included offense.

After reviewing case and statutory law in

depth, the Court concluded, for reasons set forth in detail in
its decision, that there are two standards to be applied.
First, when the prosecution requests the jury instruction, the
•necessarily included offense" standard should be applied.
This standard relies upon a comparison of the abstract
statutory elements of the offenses, i.e., both the legal
elements and the actual evidence or inferences needed to
demonstrate those elements must necessarily be included within
the original charged offense (Baker, slip op. at 217).
Second, when the defendant requests the jury instruction, the
•evidence-based" standard should be applied.

This standard

requires an analysis of the evidence offered at trial and is
incorporated in U.C.A. 1953, S 76-1-402(4), which is discussed
below(~,

slip op. at 219).

The definitions of an •included offense" and the
rule for charging the jury in respect to the lesser included
offense are contained in u.c.A. 1953, S 76-1-402, which
provides in the part pertinent to this case:
(3) A defendant may be convicted of
an offense included in the offense charged
but may not be convicted of both the
Offense charged and the included offense.
An offense is so included when:

- 6 -

(a) It is established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts required
to establish the commission of the offense
charged; or

* * *

(4) The court shall not be obligated
to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a
rational basis for a verdict acquitting
the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the including offense.
The

requirements of Section 76-l-402(3)(a) were

explained by the Court in Baker, supra (slip op. at 9), as
follows:
Paragraph (3)(a) says that an offense is
included in a charged offense when "it is
established by proof of the same or less
than all the facts required to establish
the commission of the offense charged."
The analysis of whether an offense is
included for purposes of deciding whether
to grant a defendant's request for a jury
instruction must therefore begin with the
proof of facts at trial.
If the same
facts tend to prove elements of more than
one statutory offense, then the offenses
are related under S 76-1-402. The
application of~ 76-l-402(3)(a) will thus
require some reference to the statutory
elements~the offenses involved in order
to determine whether given facts are
"required to establish the commission of
the offense charged."
Appellant was charged with the crime of aggravated
assault which is proscribed by u.c.A. 1953, S 76-5-103.

This

section must be read in conjunction with U.C.A. 1953, S

76-5-102.

The portions of these statutes pertinent to this

rase provide:

-
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76-5-102(1) Assault is:

* * *
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of
immediate force or violence, to do bodily
injury to another.
76-5-103.
(1) a person commits aggravated
assault if he commits assault as defined
in Section 76-5-102 and;

* * *
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such
means of force likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury.
The crime of "threatPning with a dangerous weapon' is
proscribed by u.c.A. 1953,

~

76-10-506, which provides:

76-10-506.
Every person, except
those persons described in Section
76-10-503, who, not in necessary defense
in the presence of two or more persons,
draws or exhibits any dangerous weapon in
an angry and threatening manner or
unlawfully uses the same in any fight or
quarrel is guilty of a class B misdemeanor,
Appellant argues that "threatening with a dangerous
weapon" is a lesser included offense to the offense charged.
He states that two elements in Section 76-5-103 and 76-10-506
"overlap" in that they both contain the elements of a threat,
or in a threatening manner, and the use of a weapon, and that
under the facts of this case the two statutes proscribe the
same conduct.

In State v. Verdin, 595 P.2d 862 (Utah 1979),

which case the appellant discusses at some length in his
brief, this Court held that

-tic

76-10-506 do not proscribe tr.,

1

"'fi-5-103 and section

• me coriciuct, saying: "the

distinctions in levels of proscribed conduct are clear and
- 8 -

easily to be comprehended."

In arriving at that conclusion,

the court employed the •necessarily included offense"
6 tandard.

It appears in the instant case, however, that under

the •evidence-based" standard, the offense of threatening with
a dangerous weapon would be a lesser included offense to
aggravated assault for the reason that there is an overlapping
of certain elements of each offense, as stated by appellant,
and the evidence produced by the prosecution would prove all
of the elements of each offense.
Assuming that the offense of threatening with a
dangerous weapon is a lesser included offense in the offense
of aggravated assault, the court under section 76-1-402(4) is
still not obligated to charge the jury as to the lesser
offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting
him of the included offense.

With respect to Section

76-1-402(4), this court said in the recent case of State v.

Crick, et al., No. 18080, filed November 9, 1983 (slip op. at
6, 7):

In determining whether there is a
•rational basis• for acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of a lesser included
offense, the court must, of course, view
the evidence and the inferences that can
be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the defense. state v.
Gillian, 23 Utah 2d at 376, 463 P.2d at
814. Similarly, as we said more recently
in State v. Baker, supra, slip op. at 10:
(W]en the evidence is ambiguous and
therefore susceptible to alternative
- 9 -

interpretations, and one alternative would
permit acquittal of the greater offense and
conviction of the lesser, a jury question exists
and the court must give a lesser included
offense instruction at the request of the
defendant.
The evidence in this case does not provide a
rational basis for appellant's requested instruction on
threatening with a dangerous weapon.

The evidence presented

by the prosecution is clear and unambiguous and not
susceptible to any alternative interpretation permitting
acquittal of the offense of threatening with a dangerous
weapon. Officer Evans heard the cocking of a revolver, turned
on his flashlight and saw defendant pointing a revolver at
him; in a separate incident, Officer Sickels saw appellant
standing in the stairwell with a revolver pointing up the
stairway; while Officer Evans was asking appellant to throw
his gun out, Officers Sickels and Dana heard a cylinder turn
and the clicking of a revolver; upon arrest, six bullets were
found in appellant's left front pants pocket and a holster in
his right rear pocket; and during the time appellant was
talking to his wife, she did not see a revolver.
Appellant contradicted the prosecutor's evidence.
He testified that he removed the bullets from the revolver
when he took it out of his truck; that he intended to give the
revolver to his wife; that the cylinder of the revolver was
open all the time he was in the stairwell; that at no time dirl
he point the revolver at the police or up the stairway but was
merely standing at the bottom of the stairwell with both arms
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hanging at his sides with the revolver hanging down on one of
his fingers.
Thus, the evidence is such that, if the jury were to
believe appellant's testimony, no offense at all was committed
because the element of a threat is missing, which element is a
necessary element in both offenses.

The evidence shows that

appellant made no verbal threats and, according to his
testimony, he did not exhibit the revolver in a threatening
manner or otherwise threaten the police officers.

Conse-

quently, there was no rational basis for a verdict acquitting
appellant of aggravated assault and convicting him of the
lesser included offense of threatening with a dangerous
weapon.
Appellant's argument that the District Court erred
in failing to charge the jury with the lesser included offense
cl threatening with a dangerous weapon ignores the provision

of U.C.A. 1953,

~

76-1-402(4), which provides that the court

shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a
verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the inlcuded offense.

The prosecution met

its burden of proof with respect to the offense of aggravated
assault and there is nothing in the evidence presented by the
prosecutor that would warrant a finding that a lesser offense
was committed.

Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence

presented by appellant that would warrant a finding that a
- 11 -

lesser offense was committed since his evidence, if bel1everl
by the jury, would only prove his

co~plete

innocence,

This

i~

a case wherein either the offense of aggravated assault was
committed or no offense was committed.
CONCLUSION
The District Court did not err in refusing to submit
to the jury the lesser included offense requestd by appellant
and the verdict and judgment rendered in the District Court
should be affirmed,
RESPECTFULLY submited

~
this~ day

of March, 1984,

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General

}JuJ;~:~~
WRIG~ VOL~-E-R.

H.
Assistant Attorney General
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